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Abstract 
There is a class of artifacts bodies and their science, also known as 3M & 
I-bodies in 2008, which consist of human, material/machine, monetary and 
informational components. For multi-body systems, the paper discusses and 
develops the scientific and economic fundamentals of the Follett-like classifi-
cation as domination, compromise, integration and sharing in 2-center con-
flict types (Matsui, 1983). That is, the mathematical view is based on the 
Venn diagram of sets in mathematics, the physical view is based on the prin-
ciple of the lever in Archimedes’ work, and the economical view is based on 
the profit (specific gravity) and Matsui’s equation. From a systematic view 
composed of these, it is obtained that the integration pursues the maximiza-
tion of intersection (compromise) in the two-center, whereas the sharing 
pursues the minimization of intersection (compromise) in field. When the 
marginal (maximal) profit is the same, both are pointed out to be similar on 
the relation of classical Nash’s solution and duality; the scientific and eco-
nomic findings will contribute to the advance of the coming society and its 
visibility and harmony in collaboration vs. sharing. 
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1. Introduction 
Our study is related to artifacts bodies, also known as 3M & I-bodies in 2008 [1], 
which consist of human, material/machine, monetary and informational com-
ponents. In enterprises or society, based on our past works [1] [2] [3] [4], this 
paper develops the lever and the balancing principle of collaboration [5], which 
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are the integration vs. sharing problem in 3M & I-body systems, and discusses 
the digital collaboration and balancing science of multi-bodies in sharing from a 
mathematical, physical and economical point of view. 
For the classical collaboration in homogeneity, traditional collaboration stu-
dies began with the conflict problem of sales (demand) vs. manufacturing 
(supply) non-cooperation in heterogeneity. 
Generally, the marketing section in enterprises is interested in the maximiza-
tion of sales, and, conversely, the manufacturing section is interested in the mi-
nimization of costs. However, the difference between sales and costs is not 
maximized, if there is no cooperation in the functional organization. This origi-
nal issue is a gaming approach to the joint policy on order-selection (sales) vs. 
switch-over (manufacturing) model in a job shop at 1983 [2]. 
This collaboration model, the so-called two-center problem, was first dis-
cussed as a management game model (MGM) in 1999 [4]. Our work on the 
MGM model was summarized in 2008, and the main topic was also presented in 
a Japanese paper (2005) in “Diamond Harvard Business Review” and was later 
recorded in English [1]. 
Recently, Nof et al. [6] discussed the modern collaboration and published an 
evolutional book on the ICT-engineering of collaboration from the perspective 
of e-work, business, and services with robotics. The framework could compre-
hend many types of process (procedure) modeling in cooperation with 3M & 
I-body artifacts originating in our ICPR paper in 1997 [3]. 
On the other hand, for multi-body systems, our paper re-reviews and develops 
the Follett-like classification [7] in terms of domination, compromise, integra-
tion and sharing in conflict types. The world of economics is now para-
digm-changing from ownership (material) to usership (thing), and the subject of 
collaboration will then transfer from the class of domination/compromise (bot-
tleneck/conflict) to integration/sharing (unification/harmony) toward digitaliza-
tion. 
Especially, the integration pursues the maximization of intersection (com-
promise) in the two-center, whereas the sharing pursues the minimization of in-
tersection (compromise) in field. When the marginal (maximal) profit is the 
same, both are found to be similar on the relation of classical Nash’s solution 
and duality. 
Also, our original type “invisible collaboration in SCM [8] [9] is similar to A. 
Smith’s economics [10] under demand speed (sharing). This principle of 
d-balancing, in which d means the invisible hand of input type, might be similar 
to the nonlocality of Quantum Mechanics in physics (spacetime). 
The paper discusses and develops the scientific and economic fundamentals of 
the Follett-like classification as domination, compromise, integration and shar-
ing in 2-center conflict types (Matsui, 1983) [2]. 
Organizations of this paper as follows. Section 2 addresses collaboration vs. 
balancing issues, and Section 3 identifies new views of collaboration science. Af-
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ter that, Section 4 discusses coming views of collaboration science. Finally, con-
clusions and future studies are developed in Section 5. 
2. Collaboration vs. Balancing Issues 
2.1. Traditional Problem at Business 
For the classical collaboration in homogeneity, traditional collaboration studies 
began with the conflict problem of sales (demand) vs. manufacturing (supply) 
non-cooperation in heterogeneity. This original issue is a gaming approach to 
the joint policy on order-selection (sales) vs. switch-over (manufacturing) model 
in a job shop at 1983 [2]. Do business and manufacturing really coexist in your 
company? How can you attempt to measure the effective coexistence but not the 
conflict?  
The conflict in these two functions is a classic, unresolved and heterogeneous 
problem. This subject is presented as a class of the so-called two-center and 
d-balancing problems by demand speed (d) [1] [5], found in the traditional 
scheme. From past literatures [1] [7], the scheme is seen in traditional manage-
ment as follows: 
In 1933, a business administration researcher named Mary Parker Follet pre-
sented a lecture in London [7]. The topic on which she presented remains rele-
vant in the twenty-first Century. She discussed the functional relations between 
these sections in the form of “Separation of Planning Division,” even though 
about 100 years have passed since Frederic Taylor’s scientific management was 
generated. It is said that Follet was different, even though there was much criti-
cism of his organization theory according to this function. This problem was al-
so discussed about 30 years ago, but those who conducted research on market-
ing, including Kotler [11], also admitted the importance of correspondence to be 
able to achieve harmony between sections. At 1993, cooperative issues were 
summarized by Eliashberg and Steinberg [12]. 
How should one resolve the conflict between business and manufacturing and 
how should one achieve collaboration? We are calling this the “Two-Center 
Problem” [1] [4]. This problem is where Follet also positively admits the mean-
ing of the conflict, and it is necessary to quickly resolve the problem so that 
management and society maybe developed.  
To resolve this conflict, the relationship between sales (A) and production (B) 
centers should be classified into domination, compromise and integration [1] 
[7]. The bottleneck type is a special case of a 2-center model, and the sharing 
type is added as the extended type of VMI (vender-managed inventory) [13]. 
Also, our original type “the invisible collaboration in SCM is similar to A. 
Smith’s economics under demand speed (sharing)”, and the central (ERP) vs. 
distributed (series/parallel) type of multi-body in heterogeneity is comparatively 
discussed [1] [14]. Under digital collaboration, our question is which of integra-
tion or sharing would be better on our society in nature vs. artifacts? Probably, 
this issues would be not yet seen at today’s literature. 
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2.2. Collaboration by Objectives vs. Motivations 
For 3M & I-body, the mathematical, physical and economical view are applied 
and discussed at the following sections. That is, the mathematical view is based 
on the Venn diagram of sets, the physical view is based on the principle of the 
lever in Archimedes’ work, and the economical view is based on the profit equa-
tion. 
The respective collaboration issues in heterogeneous problem could be ap-
propriately re-classified by objectives and motivations in Table 1. 
1) Goal-seeking in optimization  
This is similar to the area of operations research (OR/MS). The mathematical 
(OR-like) view on collaboration gives the representative definition and motiva-
tion in the integration of body system by goal-seeking. 
2) Leverage balancing in physics 
For integration, the opposite category is the sharing in space and time (field), 
because the integration focuses on the maximization of intersection (compro-
mise), whereas the sharing focuses on its minimization in the field including the 
complement.  
The leverage balancing in physics is motivated at the sharing in space by the 
principle of lever. For example, there is the sharing in the common file (seat) at 
cloud/block-chain and in the common car at transportation (so-called car shar-
ing). 
3) Demand-balancing in economics 
The demand-balancing in economics is motivated at the sharing in time, that 
is, the medium balancing at demand speed, d. This d-balancing problem is seen 
on the upper level of the two-level scheme in the hierarchy. This main problem 
can be broken down into two sub-problems: 
( ) , 1, 2, ,i i lF I i nβ= =                      (1) 
in the respective body of entity i in the Newsboy problem. Matsui’s point (me-
dium), iβ , is based on the so-called Chameleon’s criteria [14]. 
Currently, the following condition is considered according to the demand 
speed (cycle time), d (0 < d < 1), and the exponential service with the mean, im
(supply speed). That is, 
( ) ( )1 exp , 1,2, ,i i iG d d m i nβ= − − = =              (2) 
and the demand speed, d, is as follows: 
( )1 1 2 2 .n n W ZLα β α β α β= = = = =             (3) 
In d-balancing, the following relation is also obtained from (3): 
( ) ( )ln 1 ln 1 , .i i j jm m i jβ β− = − ≠                 (4) 
In particular, for Poisson service, the optimal condition is 
( ) ( )1 ; 1 , 1, 2, ,i
I
i i i iiF I P d m i nβ== = − =∑              (5) 
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where ( )P ⋅  is a Poisson type distribution. 
Table 1. Collaboration of objectives and motivations in heterogeneity. 
Triple views Basics Objectives Motivations 
(a) mathematical set/logics integration goal_seeking 
(b) physical lever rule sharing (space) leverage balancing 
(c) economical specific gravity sharing (time) demand balancing 
 
These relationships can generally be outlined by the pitch diagram in line ba-
lancing. From this pitch diagram and Matsui’s equation W ZL=  [1] [14], the 
balance equation is 
1 ,
iI
ii MI nZ= =∑                        (6) 
and the second balancing principle is 
iL ZL MI ZL W< < =∑                    (7) 
from (6) and the classic inequality. 
From [8] [9], it is noted that the so-called invisible collaboration would cor-
respond to the balancing state for any d (>0), demand speed (invisible hand). 
3. New Views of Collaboration Science 
3.1. Domination Type 
Since the industrial revolution, there is seen the separation of ownership and 
management at collaboration (dominance/compromise). Recently, this rela-
tionship is changing to transfer from ownership to usership at collaboration (in-
tegration/sharing). 
The mathematical view is based on a Venn diagram of sets and logics in ma-
thematics, and on a definition in the multi-body collaboration class. The physi-
cal view is based on the principle of the lever and on specific gravity (profit vs. 
cost ratio at profit equation) in physics (Archimedes’ work). The economical 
view is based on the principle of balancing (win-win) in 3M & I-body science. In 
these views, one could totally ascertain the principle of balancing in collabora-
tion issues in Matsui’s equation [1] [5]. 
First, let us consider the type of dominance vs. compromise collaboration in 
the functional organization. These are well known as the traditional types of col-
laboration in ownership. For the dominance type of bodies ① (②) that the body 
B (A) belongs and follows or not the body A (B), the three aspects of views are 
systematically seen in Figures 1-3, respectively, from Matsui [1] as follows: 
Figure 1 is the alternative notation of intension in mathematics, and Figure 2 
is a physical view on the base of lever rule in Figure 1. 
In Figure 3, an optimal condition (balancing) is assumed from the classic in-
equality and Matsui’s equation (W = ZL) [5] as follows: 
Hypothesis: 
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( )1 1 2 2 .n n W ZLα β α β α β= = = = =                   (8) 
 
Figure 1. Dominance/occupation ( A B⊃  and 
A B⊂ ). Mathematical (set) view. 
 
 
Figure 2. Principle of lever in revenue. Physical (lever) view. 
 
 
Figure 3. Body-balancing system of supply chain economics in Matsui [14]. 
Economical (value) view. 
 
In (8), Z and L correspond to ia  and iβ , respectively, and W means a ba-
lancing value at the equilibrium. 
3.2. Compromise Type (A-B) 
At the compromise type of bodies that have common intersection, the three as-
pects of views are similar to Section 3.1 and are systematically presented as fol-
lows: 
Figure 4 is the product ⑤ and sclm ⑥ in set notation, and Figure 5 is the re-
spective lever rule on the base of specific gravity at Figure 4. 
At the trade type of compromise (c) in Figure 6, the win-win strategy in bo-
dies is different to the series vs. parallel type [14]. The former is profit-even and 
of the SCM (Supply Chain Management) type consisting sales and manufactur-
ing stages in series. Also, the latter is cost-even and of the ERP (Enterprise Re-
source Planning) type composed of such the multi-functional division as sales 
𝑍𝐵
𝑍𝐴
𝐿𝐵(β�𝐵)
𝐿𝐴(β�𝐴)
③ZB?̅?B=𝑍𝐴?̅?𝐴 (𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒)
𝑍𝐵𝑍𝐴
𝐿𝐵(β�𝐵)𝐿𝐴(β�𝐴)
④Z𝐴?̅?𝐴=𝑍𝐵?̅?𝐵 （𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒)
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and production divisions in heterogeneity. Note that both are dualat series vs. 
parallel type. 
 
Figure 4. Conflicts and integration ( A B and A B∩ ∪ ). Mathematical (set) view. 
 
 
Figure 5. Principle of lever at specific gravity. Physical (lever) view. 
 
 
Figure 6. SCM (series) vs. ERP (parallel) in MGMs. Economical (value) view. 
 
For the class of dominance vs. compromise, it is shown that the compromise 
is limited or negotiated, and the dominance (occupancy) is vertically maximal at 
the extent of intersection (conflict). Also, it is noted that the ERP and SCM are 
dual in parallel vs. series. 
4. Coming Views of Collaboration Science 
4.1. Integration Type 
Under digitalization and user ship, we would like to ask the next which of inte-
gration or sharing is better on our society in nature vs. artifacts? At the integra-
tion type of bodies, the three aspects of views are also seen at the sublation of in-
tersection by inclusion as follows: 
warter
⑦𝒁𝑨𝜷�𝑨 = 𝒁𝑩𝜷�𝑩(𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆) warter⑧𝒁𝑨𝑳𝑨 = 𝒁𝑩𝑳𝑩(𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒕)
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By the general definition, it is here noted that there is used the proof by con-
tradiction,  
Figure 7 shows the Invisible chain and collaboration: (a), (b) and (c). By the 
general definition, it is here noted that there is used the proof by contradiction, 
that is, the contradiction of A⋀B＝φ (empty) is corresponded to its complement 
(field). Figure 7(a) relates to the complement of sets A and B. In this type, the 
following is noted. In the physical view (b), the win-win strategy is the balancing 
of costs or profits. However, in the economical view (c), it is not the direct sum 
of profits, but the dual sum or balancing of profits. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
A B
Body Body
𝐸𝑁𝐴 𝐸𝑁𝐵
flow(d)
𝐸𝑅1 + 𝐸𝑅2
field
“Jyukvtt” invisible collaboration
:material               :information
d : demand speed/cycle time (sharing)
A,B : heterogeneous bodies
𝐷𝐸𝑁:𝐸𝑛 = (𝐸𝑅𝐴−𝐸𝐶𝐴)+ + (𝐸𝑅𝐵−𝐸𝐶𝐵)+
Max ⇒ 𝐸𝑁𝐴 = 𝐸𝑁𝐴 < 𝑊𝑖𝑛 −𝑊𝑖𝑛 >
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Figure 7. Invisible chain and collaboration: (a) Mathematical (set) view; (b) Physical 
(lever) view; (c) Economical (value) view [5]. 
4.2. VMI-Sharing Type 
At the VMI-sharing type of bodies, this type is called the vendor-managed in-
ventory (VMI) at inventory management [13], and many types of sharing have 
been seen recently in community economics. These views of three aspects are 
original and are visible as follows: 
Figure 8 shows the visible chain and sharing: (a), (b) and (c). Figure 8(a) 
gives the mathematical notation of sharing type, and shows the sum of slash area 
in sets A and B. For the class of integration vs. sharing, the followings are noted. 
At the physical view (b), the weight of the chain (sub-optimal) corresponds to 
the amount or balancing of costs in bodies. However, at the economical view (c), 
the strength of the chain (overall optimization) corresponds to the max-product 
of profits at even-profit. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
A B
A－B B－A
EC
𝐸𝐶: 𝐴 − 𝐵 𝑜𝑟 (𝐵 − 𝐴)
𝐴∆𝐵: 𝐴 − 𝐵  ∪  (B − A)
×
BA
×
𝑍𝐴 𝑍𝐵
𝐿𝐴 𝐿𝐵
EC𝐿𝐴: weight
(fixed)
𝐿𝐵: weight
(fixed cost)
𝑍𝐴𝐿𝐴 = 𝑍𝐵𝐿𝐵(weight cost)
A B
Chain
powerpower EC
Strength of chain(value chain)
𝐸𝑁𝐴𝐵 =  𝐸𝑁𝐴 × 𝐸𝑁𝐵 ⇔min(𝐸𝑁𝐴 ,𝐸𝑁𝐵 )
EN : profit(specific gravity) EC : operating cost
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(c) 
Figure 8. Visible chain and sharing: (a) Mathematical (set) view; (b) Physical 
(lever) view; (c) Economical (value) view.  
Also, from the economical view (c), it is conjectured that the integration is 
larger than the sharing in different profits. Because, the former is the arithmeti-
caverage: 2A BEN EN+ , and the latter is the geometric mean: A BEN EN×  
in collaboration. Note that both are dual at integration vs. sharing type. 
Thus, the maximum of sharing is commutative to the integration (unifica-
tion), and this means the full sharing in horizontal dominance for different prof-
its. Note that, if each profit of bodies is equal, the sharing is equivalent to the in-
tegration. There is seen and critical the classical Nash’s solution in duality. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, the collaboration and balancing science of multi-bodies were dis-
cussed from a mathematical, physical and economical point of view. These three 
views give a systematic and total view, and the view is consistent with the colla-
boration vs. balancing principle in [5]. Also, the sublation basis on traditional 
integration vs. modern sharing under multi-body conflicts is comparatively con-
sidered in heterogeneity. 
In conclusion, this paper presents the basis of collaboration science toward 
digitalization, and the integration vs. sharing principle in duality is positioned as 
the main principal in the 3M & I-body system. From now on, the digital colla-
boration should be transformed from the integration toward sharing issues. The 
additional subjects are the form utilization and realization toward the analysis 
and design of artifacts collaboration in connection with the sandwich principal. 
From the paper, our study would be valuable to the visibility and harmony of 
mixture of body (lot) and sharing at digital collaboration, and also, the findings 
would contribute to the science/engineering design of artifacts (robots) in or-
ganizations and societies.  
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